I . Introduction
The economic rationale behind antitrust concern for horizontal mergers rests primarily on the the familiar structure-performance paradigm that links market concentration with sup ra-competitive profits and, implicitly, with higher prices.
A vast empirical literature has demonstrated a positive statistical relationship between measures of industry structure, such as entry barriers and concentration, and average industry profit using cross section data. A small number of cross section studies, most dealing with banking services, have claimed to find a positive relationship between concentrated market structure and price measures / , but we are unaware of any study that traces the ef fect of an actual in mark et structure on prices or profits.
In this paper we exploit an unusual opportunity to test for price effects and estimate profit consequences of two acquisitions that resulted in substantial increases in the market share of the acquiring firm.
The evidence we examine arises from a recent Federal Trade Commission antitrust suit against Xidex corporation, the world's largest producer of duplicating microfilm. The Xidex case is unusual in three respects.
( 1) Although the size of the market is small ( sales under $100 million) , the acquisitions involved greater changes in market shares than are usual in antitrust actions. ( 2) The suit was brought five years after the first acquisition and two years after the second, so a post-acquisition record of price behavior exists for this example. Furthermore, the price data used in this study are actual transaction prices. types of "non-silver" duplicating microfilm known as "diazo" and "vesicular". These two types of microfilm employ photo-imaging processes that can only be used for making duplicate copies from "silver" ( halide) originals.Z/ They have a significant cost advantage compared to the alternative of using silver duplicating film ( an advantage estimated at one-fourth to one-half the cost of using silver film) and are much simpler to handle and to 93% Combining the two products, the 197 6 acquisition increased Xidex's share of U.S. "non-silver microfilm" sales from 46% to 55% , and the 1979 acquisition raised it from 61% to 70% . Q/ Judging from market-share statistics, these acquisitions would appear to have had a significant impact on market st ucture. The issue we examine next is whether there were discernible effects on the prices of diazo and vesicular duplicating microfilm as a result of Xidex's ext nsion of "market· power" in the two product lines.
Our study uses data covering a ten year period. In order to identify and measure price effects due to the acquisitions, we have to control for the influence during that period of general inflation and changes in the costs of inputs specific to the production of diazo and vesicular microfilm. For example, the cost of plastic film base in cr· eased due to the increase in petroleum prices, which also affected the cost of coatings since the coatings for both films use petroleum based resins. For both types of film, the cost of the film base and chemicals used for the coatings are estimated to account for 50% and processes, the vesicular-to-diazo price ratio for a given configuration should not be much affected by changes in petroleum prices, productivity, or general inflation. In making diazo or vesicular microfilm a coating is applied to a roll of plastic film base, which is the same for both types of microfilm. The coated film base is then cut into strips of various widths and lengths in the case of roll microfilm or into small sheets for aperture cards or microfiche. The difference between the production of the two film types is that a different coating is applied, but even these have many basic ingredients in common and the processes used to coat the films are very similar. / We shall examine whether there is a change in the relative price ratio following the acquisition affecting each product line. We should note that our method of using price ratios to identify price effects from the acquisitions is biased against finding such effec ts to the extent that the two pr odu cts are good substitutes. If they were perfect substitutes, increases in absolute prices might have no effect on the price ratio. we have .
an equation containing price ratios corresponding to average price ratios, and Therefore one method of estimating v R ki R si · wou ld be to use ************************ ****** ( 4 ') R ki
which yields an estimate of v calculated as v = it implicitly R ki / R si -1. The problem with this approach is that assumes any effect of the Scott acquisition on diazo prices persisted during the period following Kalvar acquisition. Suppose the Scott acquisition had a positive but more brief effect on diazo prices.
Since this effect is embedded in R si ' using ( 4') would result in an estimate of v that would be biased upward. We have adopted the more conservative approach of assuming that d = 0 at the time of the Kalvar acquisition. We use as defined above but compare R ki it with Re i rather than R si · The estimate of v that we use is therefore given by v = R ki / R ci -1.
Results. Statistical tests are given in Table 1 . The values of R e i , R s · and R ki for each of the eighteen rna tching i , configurations are given in the first three columns of Table 1 ******************************* Place Table 1 This is consistent with ( but, of course, does not confirm) the possibility that the price impact of the Scott acquisition was being dissipated, since a decline in d from its initial value would be reflected in a rising value for the V/ D price ratio.
IV. Estimates of the Short-run Effects on Profits
We now turn to estimating the impact of the acquisitions on Xidex's profits. The acquisitions may have increased profits through economies of scale in production and distribution or from Xidex's superior management skill.ll/ Our interest, however, is with the increase in profits due to the elevation of prices above their competitive benchmark levels. We denote these "supra Methodology.
competitive" profits as "' ( with subscripts d and v where appropriate ) .
******************************
Place Figure 2 about here ****.**************************
To estimate supra-competitive profits we take Xidex sal s revenue for each product line separately following the acquisition affecting that product line and then subtract the . .
estimate of sales at competitive benchmark prices.
In Figure 2 let DD represent Xidex's ( annual) demand curve for one of the two products in a particular post-acquisition year. P' and Q' are post acquisition price and quantity; P denotes the benchmark competitive price and Q the quantity that Xidex would sell at that price. Total sales revenue, S = P'Q', is the sum of areas A, B, and C. Our estimate of su ra-competitive profit due to the price effect of the acquisition is given by area A. Using the
the dollar value of areas B + C is given by
So the value of 77' ( area A) is given by
7)
The j TT' = P' Q' -PQ ' = S --------.
( 1 + j)
estimates of supra-competitive profits on diazo and vesicular· Qualifications.
. . microfilm for post acquisition years are calculated from (7) using annual sales revenue for the product in question and our estimates of d or v substituted for j. These estimates are given in last two columns of Table 2 .
Place Table 2 about here.
Before discussing them further, we need to discuss a source of possible upward bias in these profit estimates and to point out sources of offsetting downward bias that are due to our conservative assumptions. In Figure 2 , area A measures the gain in profits due to the price effects of the acquisition correctly only if P is the "true" competitive price yielding no excess profits. Recall, however, that P is an estimate of the price that would have obtained had the acquisition not taken place. Since the sales for both diazo and vesicular were highly concentrated in few sellers before the acquisitions, prices might have been above competitive levels due to oligopolistic behavior. If P actually is above the true competitive price, P c , then th value of the profit gain ( due to price increases) is A minus D rather than A alone. Our procedure for estimating rr' thus assumes Xidex was earning only a com p e t i t i v e rate o f r e turn at p ric e P ; in other word s i t· implicitly assumes P = P c · If P > P c , then our procedure
Qverstates the gain in profits attributable to the price P) Q'
Q' The relative
size of the bias is, therefore, given by
represent the proportional difference between P and P c , as P c ) / P, or P ( 1 -m) = P c · Using this definition of m we
Now a reasonable definition of arc elasticity of demand, with primes denoting new prices and quantities, is
Instead of P and Q or P' and Q', the reference point is an average over the arc obtained by using P and Q' which is closer to the middle of the arc. / From equations ( 9) and (10) Table 2 ) . Notice we also ignore the possibility of any upra-competitive profit on diazo for fiscal year 1977 even though the Sc9tt acquisition took place in June 
